Abstract
After more than 50 years and several attempts at negotiations, Columbia
cannot stop violent internal conflicts that are tearing the society. Over time,
the creation of guerrilla and self-defense groups (Paramilitaries) multiplied
and fought each other. At the heart of this violent struggle, there is the
fight for coca production and control of drug trafficking market. But in this
scene of increased violence the civilian population is unfortunately the main
victim. Why this crisis lasts so long? Why previous negotiations failed and did
not find any solution to end the crisis? These negotiation processes have never
tried to gather all sectors of the civil society and armed groups around the
same table to discuss about the crisis. That's the biggest challenge of the
Colombian society.
The conflict in Colombia is one of the world´s oldest of internal armed
conflicts. The creation of the main guerrilla groups still active FARC
(Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia) and the ELN (Ejército de
Liberación Nacional) dates from the years 1950 and 1960. The extension of
this confrontation can be explained both by internal political developments
(weakness of the territorial state presence, exclusive control of power by the
two traditional parties) and by external influences (diffusion of the
revolution in the 1960s, drug trafficking in the late 1970s).
Since then, the country is developing under the influence of violence.
Thousands of kidnappings and disappearances; annually, over 20,000 victims
among the civilian population prove the seriousness of the situation. Since the
failure of several attempts of negotiations, the violence has been increased,
thus causing the displacement of thousands of people. In 2013 the number of
registered IDPs (internally displaced people) is more than 5.7 million.
UNHCR estimates that Colombia is the country, after Sudan, with the highest
number of IDPs.
Indeed, all armed groups want to appropriate the territory for a strategic
issue, the cultivation of coca, or even to take hold of private properties.
To understand the reasons for this extension of the armed conflict, it
is essential to elucidate its causes. But this extension of the conflict also
requires the examination of difficulties of its resolution. Since the 1980s,
various attempts of negotiation took place: their successive failures weigh on
both the strategies of the government and guerrilla groups. With the election
of Alvaro Uribe to the presidency in 2002, the situation was characterized by a
strategy of open armed confrontation. That prevents any prospect of a
negotiated solution. For this government, the end of armed conflict seemed
possible only by military way. But this did not mean the end of armed groups
and the violence. Since the election of President Juan Manuel Santos in 2010,
the parties have started new negotiations and have confirmed their desire to
end the conflict. In 2012 the official negotiations were launched in Cuba, but
suspended in 2014 due to the abduction of military officials. Therefore the process
and results of these negotiations appear to be blurred.
This paper aims to study the complexity of the Colombian armed conflict:
its history, its main actors and the motivations of actors. This text does not
pretend to be an exhaustive analysis of the nature of these ideologies, but
rather to expose and update the interests of these actors, depending on the
evolution of the conflict. At the end, some proposals will be analyzed to achieve
a process of peace.
The internal armed conflict in Colombia has its roots in the period of
La Violencia between 1949 and 1953. This was a very bloody civil war
between the two major political parties: the Conservatives, then in power, and
the Liberals. Violence debuted after the assassination of Jorge Elicer Gaitan
in 1948, leader of the Liberal Party. Following a brief period of military
dictatorship, the Liberal and Conservative parties came together in 1957 and
created a coalition called Frente Nacional (National Front). This
agreement was intended to put an end to armed clashes, but mainly to prevent
another conflicts by a power-sharing agreement. As part of this agreement,
liberals and conservatives alternated the presidency and would share the
positions of political leadership from the central to local government. The
agreement was sustainable: it was established for four presidential terms
(1958-1974) and continues thereafter in practices coalition government.
This agreement excluded small armed groups from other political trends
that are neither liberal nor conservative. In remote regions, rural communities
were organized during the Violencia´s Period in self-defense militias in
the context of civil war.
Influenced by communist ideas, from the defense of their land and establishment
of collective structures of means of production, they refused their
demobilization at the end of the period of La Violencia and
rejected the power-sharing pact between liberals and conservatives. In the
context of reconstruction of institutions, these militias appeared to elites as
an obstacle to national reconciliation process. Thus, the government undertook
to attack them by force in 1964-1965.
Despite the military offensive against them, these groups are not
destroyed. Nor politically integrated into the regime or defeated militarily,
they formally came together in organized protest movements that have undertaken
the first activities of the Colombian guerrillas. The two most important
revolutionary movements, which were born in reaction to these events and are
still active, are the FARC, created in 1966, and ELN, formed in 1964. The EPL
group (Ejercicio Popular de Liberación), founded in 1967,
was also influential, but it was demobilized in 1990.
In contrast to these groups, another important mysterious group cams in
addition to the conflict: the paramilitaries or “paracos”. I name them
mysterious because they were not an organized and structured body like the
guerrillas groups. The paramilitaries are the answer that conservative elites
have made to defend their economic and political interests in a context of
widespread violence. It was legalized by Parliament: ´´with Decree 3398 of 1965 and Law 48 of
1968, it became legal in Colombia to create civil defence groups to confront
guerrillas and to support the army in counterinsurgency efforts´´.
These groups are formed by landowners allied to drug traffickers to fight
against guerrillas. Their actions are no different from their enemies’
guerrillas; they are as violent as these. They all both have in common:
violence and terrorize the civilian population.
They “paracos” finally gained national unity in 1997, under the name of
United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC- Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia).
This movement of the right is widely tolerated and sometimes assisted by the
Colombian army.
It defends the interests of large landowners and has as its goal the removal of
all the aspirations of communist-types. Several observers have noted a direct
association between the military and the AUC, and military condone their camps
and activities. Yet the paramilitaries, such as the FARC, fueled by income
provides drug trafficking. In addition, the United States and the Soviet Union
(USSR) sometime supported, according to their own interests, the main
protagonists of the Colombian conflict. This international interference has
greatly contributed to the degeneration of the conflict.
Several other rebel groups, such as the M19, emerged. This group
consisted of radical nationalist and populist and was active from 1973 to 1990.
It has enjoyed a great popularity due to spectacular actions, for example the
theft of 5000 weapons and the occupation of the Embassy of the Dominican
Republic (1980) as well as of the law court (1985).
The history and interests that drive the Colombian conflict help to
explain the dynamics and transformations that characterize this war. It should
be noted that these events are in a global context where the Cold War was at
its peak. Then these groups were more influenced by the diffusion of the
victory of the guerrilla in Cuba and the experience of Che Guevara in Bolivia.
Ideologically the Colombian conflict has aimed at the land distribution
and social equality. The guerrillas believe that the people are victims from
landowners and the military. This perception implies that farmers are being
ignored in favor of an imperialist financial exploitation.
Thereafter, the guerrillas abandoned its project of social emancipation and
changed in an essentially military action. However, the conflict has been
transformed and today has its origins in the drug traffic and control of land
for the cultivation of coca. Consequently, many are questioning its real desire
to become a legitimate political party in the actual military and political
context.
The FARC and some revolutionaries groups justify their violent and
criminal actions on behalf of the Colombian population and they promote their
ideals of social justice, equality and solidarity. So they can recruit
candidates and save their image to the effect that they are still fighting on
behalf of farmers and social justice. For this rebel organization, it is essential
to mention the social injustice that can justify a war and the hatred of the
enemy. This powerful message attracted also the poorest. It is interesting to
note that “the percentage of Colombia’s population that lives in severe
poverty is 50 percent or more´”.
“Colombia is the only Latin American country where inequality is growing
in all of its cities” These
inequalities contribute to reinforce the message of the FARC and the legitimacy
of the easiest option, financially and psychologically, that is the production
of coca or armed struggle against class inequality.
One
of the problems most strongly affecting the social situation of the Colombian
people is the unequal distribution of the country's wealth and welfare
resources. The income concentration is very high compared to the international
averages: «while the poorest two tenths receive only 3.1% of the income, the
richest two tenths take 59.9% of the income. The per capita incomes of the
richest ten percent are 46 times greater than those of the poorest ten percent.
As in other Latin American countries, the Colombian army takes action
against the guerrillas including negotiations with them, as it is the case of
the actual Santo’s government. If these groups are weakened, they are not
totally destroyed, unlike what happened in the rest of the region. FARC, ELN
and other groups then survive in a marginal position, acting in peripheral
areas without being truly able to destabilize the country's political
institutions.
The 1980s would dramatically change the situation, both in political and
military point of view. The development of drug trafficking has complex
effects: the drug cartels become central actors. These are not, however, the
guerrillas who then have the more ability to destabilize the government, but
the drug cartels. They will seek to influence politicians by corruption,
intimidation and violence: bombings against government buildings, assassination
of political leaders and judges, destruction of a civilian aircraft in flight,
etc.).
For guerrillas, this is a godsend: access to such a source of income allows
them to come out of marginality that characterized them. Some groups will
accommodate the presence of cartels to share illegal weapons industries. Other
groups are going to be directly involved in the organization of traffic or drug
trafficking itself. The relationship between guerrillas and cartels are complex
and variable according to the groups, regions and times. But the effect is very
fast: the FARC emerged as the powerful group and ´´increased from an
estimated 3,600 combatants in 1986 to 16,500 in 1996, while the ELN went from
about 800 in 1986 to 4,500 in 2001´´.
Between 1982 and 1986, the President Belisario Betancur proposed a
suspension of hostilities, but without disarmament, in order to realize a
national dialogue which should involve the leaders of the guerrillas. In the
context of armed truce, the FARC supported some social mobilizations,
especially farmers, and constituted a political group, the Patriotic Union (UP-Unión
Patriótica), which presented candidates for the elections. The UP got 5% in
the 1986 presidential elections, a few seats of deputies and senators, and
especially local representatives in areas of the presence of the FARC. But in
the context of violence in the country, candidates and leaders of the UP are
systematically targeted by paramilitary groups, on behalf of the fact that they
are the direct representatives of the FARC, hundreds of them are murdered, and
those who are not have to go into exile.
The end of the 1980s knows a deterioration of the situation. The
government then conducts an open war both against the drug cartels, guerrilla
groups, and even paramilitary organizations. Guerrillas, meanwhile, continue
their control of territorial actions and political influence, with complex
relationships in different regions with drug traffickers. Finally, paramilitary
organizations become truly autonomous actors: in some regions they serve as auxiliaries
to the army, in others they become real enemies of it, establishing a regime of
order through violence. And the Colombian crisis of the late 1980s is neither a
revolutionary challenge nor conflict of drugs, but the addition of these two
aspects.
In the context of deterioration of the situation, convergence occurs in
the late 1990s between different actors with the idea to get out the country of
the crisis, so the institutions have to be reformed and modernized. Sectors
within the government, political parties, groups of intellectuals and student
movement mobilized the demand of a reform of institutions. According to them,
the crisis in the country can only be solved by changing the rules of the
political game that allows renewing the old bipartisan framework, to better
represent other options and bring citizens closer to power.
The more dynamic group in this process was the M-19, constituted in 1973,
which was characterized by the middle class. The leaders of this group would be
able to integrate into the dynamics of the Constituent Assembly. They accept a
quick negotiation that allows them to demobilize and become a political
movement, the Alianza Democrática M-19, just before the elections to the
Constituent Assembly. Getting 27% of votes in the election for the Constituent
Assembly, this movement appears to be one of the main actors of the reform of
institutions. Its candidate becomes one of three co- presidents of the
Constituent Assembly, with a representative of the Liberal Party and the
Conservative Party.
The composition of the Constituent Assembly reflects the combination of
alliances. Contrary to the usual organization of Colombian politics from the
two main parties, another group is represented in the Assembly. This Assembly
apparently fulfills the function of representation of the diversity of the
society. The new text maintains political and social rights and acknowledges
the political existence of minorities as well as modernizes the functioning of
institutions. However, this initiative was short-lived, because the most
important groups of guerrillas, the FARC and the ELN, remain outside of the
processes. During the work of the Constituent Assembly, the military clashes
continue. Negotiations with the FARC resumed in late 1991 and 1992, but without
success.
The hope that the new constitution represents a solution to the
Colombian crisis lasts a short time. The two main parties rapidly regain the
control of political life. Moreover, the idea of political integration of
former guerrillas as a way of solution to the armed comfits is seriously called
into question. After the Constituent Assembly, the Alianza Democrática M-19
experienced a series of electoral defeats, so that the group ceases to exist
since 1994. This movement is undermined by internal divisions and has many
difficulties to provide a political agenda.
The failure of the political reintegration of some guerrillas led to the
continuation of the conflict. The civilian population is the first victim of
armed confrontations. The conflict also takes a relatively new face: IDPs of
the violence. Hundreds of thousands of Colombians fled the armed groups to find
a precarious refuge in different cities, especially in their peripheries. The
phenomenon is so massive that the government request in 1997 UNHCR to intervene
in Colombia to support the displaced.
The new negotiations continue between the government and guerrilla in
the years 1998-2001. President Andrés Pastrana, elected in 1998, would grant
the demilitarization of a vast area of 40,000 km2 to begin negotiations with
the FARC, with support from the international community (especially European
countries). Under this agreement, the fighting would continue outside this
area. According to some critics, President Pastrana gave the feeling of more
concessions to the guerrillas that he got the progress on the path of
appeasement.
Again, negotiations bogged down for months without substantial progress.
In February 2002, this negotiation is definitely over. Like all presidential
terms since 1982, the Pastrana´s presidency begins with a limited period of
armed conflict and ends with the widespread continuing clashes. And in turn, it
indicates a failure of new negotiation to escape the armed conflict.
The election at the presidency of Alvaro Uribe in 2002 marks a rupture
in the treatment of armed conflict. The new government took more drastic
measures than its predecessors in order to regain control of the country.
During his campaign, unlike his predecessors, Uribe announced its intention to
make an open war against the drug cartels and the guerrillas, to not seek
negotiation or political agreement. Under the name of "democratic
security",
Alvaro Uribe includes the fight against armed groups as part of the
institutional strengthening. But how?
Uribe has implemented a series of special measures,
including the recruitment of thousands of peasants as soldiers and informers.
But such a measure has created a climate of distrust in communities and
dividing people. This strategy does not help to create a sense of confidence in
the population. In addition, the relationship between the paramilitaries and
the government undermines the legitimacy of this; because it is proven that the
paramilitaries are also responsible for the majority of the deaths and
disappearances as well as the crimes against humanity and gross human rights
violations in Colombia.
Under Uribe’s government, the Colombian society is
subject to a military power rather than a local government. In other words, the
military replaces the municipal authority. This authority has full authority
over the movement of people, the imposition of the curfew and the prohibition
on the right to protest. In addition to this, there is a weak judicial system
that does not guarantee the application and enforcement of the order according
to the fundamental rules of law.
Since the President Uribe interrupts any negotiations with the FARC and
ELN, the new strategy of the government is based on the direct confrontation
against the guerrillas and drug trafficking. "Plan Colombia",
launched in September 1999 by his predecessor, is part of this policy. The plan
is funded by the international community to strengthen the military and
institutional capacity of the Colombian government in its fight against drug
trafficking. So the plan converted into military aid especially from the United
States. But the sustained interest of the United States in Colombia has been
tied to research oil in order to reduce its dependence on the Gulf countries.
With only 20% of its exploited oil resources, Colombia offers a unique
opportunity.
Between 2000 and 2005 the assistance from the United States to Colombia
is estimated at about $ 4 billion, making Colombia the third recipient of U.S.
aid in the world. This assistance allows the acquisition of modern equipment by
the Colombian army. The U.S. funds also allowed the creation of additional
battalions. It also means the permanent presence of the U.S. military in the
country for the training of elite units of the Colombian army and for
intelligence work as well as the military aerial surveillance. This aid is an
opportunity for a profound reform of the army. The numbers increase
significantly: ´´Between 1998 and 2002, the armed forces in Colombia grew by
60% to 132,000. (…). By the end of Uribe’s second term in August 2010, the
Colombian military reached 283,000´´.
This change is also qualitative, because it has become a largely professional
army.
The foreign military presence has a negative impact on the conflict. It
allows guerrilla movements to stress the motivations of the United States that
are appropriated to Colombian oil on the detriment of the Colombian population.
This claim is reinforced by the fact that U.S. forces are closely located to
the oil infrastructure. The United States are financially and politically
supporting the Government of Colombia in its fight against ´´narco-terrorism´´,
but they also pursue their own interest.
The situation of poverty and inequality in the society helps to maintain
the popularity of the FARC, which accuse the government of working against the
poor people. This has contributed to the perception that the government favors
a rich minority of the population at the expense of poor majority and working
in connivance with the United States to meet their oil interests in exchange
for weapons.
The strategy of the United States and the Colombian army also causes
another problem. In order to tackle the drugs problem, thousands of hectares
have been fumigated. This program raises concerns, because fumigation is highly
chemical and destroys the legal agriculture, while having a serious impact on
the environment and the health of populations in these regions. But this
program has had no success. Moreover, coca production has increased since the
beginning of fumigation. This is explained by the fact that coca production can
easily be relocated and may extend into areas less accessible by the army. This
is also explained by the transfer of the production of coca from other
countries in the region.
However, we must recognize that conflicts, involving the easily
exploitable natural resources such as diamonds, oil or drugs, are more
difficult to solve than any other, because the promoters have the interest to
continue the fight.
It is important to note that all Latin American conflicts, which were not
influenced by economic interests, ended, while only in Colombia persists the
violence.
Negotiation of government with the guerillas, considered as terrorists
and drug traffickers against who the government has to conduct an open war, was
not possible. Conversely, it was possible with the paramilitaries. However,
paramilitary organizations have greatly benefited from drug trafficking to
increase in number in the 1990s. Their tactic consists of controlling the
strategic areas of the production and the export of drugs through violence and
the use of terror (massacres and displacement of the civilian population,
systematic elimination of any political or social contestation).
The Uribe´s government proposed a negotiation, which involved the
demobilization and reintegration assistance of the AUC members as well as a
sentence reduction.
Several Colombian and international non- governmental organizations have
criticized the juridical gap in this process and the impunity that the
government has offered this group, which was responsible for over 50% of cases
of human rights violations in Colombia. This negotiation process had no legal
framework itself that would have a significant impact on the judicial process
of AUC criminals. Because of that, some communities are taking the law
into its hands, using violence, and thus they renew the cycle of violence.
Future
initiatives have much to learn from the failure of the paramilitary process to
address the roots of paramilitary violence or to develop a transparent process
with a common and clear understanding of the agreements reached. The process
also highlights the need to clarify jurisdictional responsibilities regarding
investigations and prosecutions of crimes committed, the need to ensure
sufficient resources for enacting the rule of law and the protection of
witnesses, and the need to establish mechanisms to monitor the implementation
of agreements and to prevent the emergence of new forms of violence.
The demobilization agreement, signed formally in February 2006 led to
the end of paramilitary organizations. The demobilized AUC had three choices:
After receiving the sentence reduction, they are either integrated into the
battalion of the Army or reintegrated within cooperatives and private vigilance
to protect private companies or properties. Finally, and this is the third
choice, some of them are joining the urban criminal groups linked to
paramilitaries.
It is important to note that members of the AUC have controlled the
majority of cities because of their non- formal mandate to secure urban areas,
helping the police and military to regain control of the country from the hands
of the guerrillas. Moreover, the demobilization of the AUC was in no way a
guarantee that the other groups would follow this process. On the contrary, the
violence is persisting in the regions of action of these demobilized combatants
and groups are reconstituted in order to control the drug trafficking. In other
words, the free areas that were left by the AUC are quickly taken over by these
paramilitary or other guerrilla groups.
The most obvious sign of balance of power in favor of military forces is
weakening the FARC. But the effects of the army reinforcement were not
immediate. Until 2003, the FARC are obtaining military success by attacking
army bases or abduction of many politicians, ministers, governors, deputies,
soldiers and police, considered as political hostages, held for a possible
prisoner exchange.
The prolongation of the conflict is gradually inducing a change in the balance
of power. Since 2001, the FARC are being in the longest period of armed
confrontation, without truce or partial agreement. The army is focusing its
actions on the regions of presence of members of the FARC Secretariat and
multiplying the success. Therefore, the number of offensive actions, taken by
the FARC, has decreased, compared to previous years.
Access to funding sources (drug trafficking, kidnapping) is much more
difficult. Since 2007, dozens of regional leaders were arrested or killed. In
addition, the numbers of FARC decreased considerably. Different liberations of
hostages are also reflecting the internal difficulties of the guerrillas.
The death of different historical leaders such as Manuel Marulanda,
Tirofijo in May 2008, reinforces the impression that the weakening of the FARC
is real. Marulanda was the head of the organization since its foundation. FARC is
certainly weakened, but not destroyed. Regional groups persist and maintain
real action capabilities. In addition, this weakening does not mean the
reducing levels of violence. In this context, the demobilization of
paramilitary organizations is only apparent: the numbers of their members are
still active and maintain strategies for territorial control through violence.
The lack of a formal framework for political negotiation obligates
Alvaro Uribe to undertake the total destruction of armed groups. But
politically, it is a bad strategy. These groups will be more difficult to
demobilize without a common national political structure. Otherwise, local
emancipations of these groups will continue to exercise the political and
social control through violence.
From the beginning of his government in 2010, President Juan Manuel
Santos has tried to make contact with the guerrillas. This
is the fourth round of negotiations in three decades between the Colombian
government and the guerrillas. Since early 2012, Timoshenko - the new commander
of the FARC- confirmed the willingness of the guerrilla group to continue
secret talks with the government. "Despite the circumstances the FARC will remain at the table,
faithful to the commitment to seek peace for Colombia through all means," affirmed the FARC negotiator Ivan Marquez.
The first phase of dialogue, called ´´exploratory" began in
February 2012 and ended in August 2012 in Havana (Cuba), with the signing of
the General Agreement to end the conflict and build stable and durable peace.
The point discussions of the negotiations are: complete agricultural
development policy; guarantees for the participation of the political
opposition; the end of the conflict; the solution of the problem of illegal
trafficking drugs; right of the victims; and the implementation of the final
negotiated agreement.
The second phase began in Oslo (Norway) in October 2012. The third phase
consists of the simultaneous implementation of all agreements, during which the
government will guarantee verification mechanisms and promote process
participation of civil society.
According to the condition, the sessions are private; no
demilitarization of territories or cessations of military operations are
possible. The dialogue takes place in a third country and their duration is
limited. Humberto de la Calle (government) and Ivan Marquez (FARC) are
responsible for each of the negotiating teams.
Unfortunately the peace talks were suspended after the
abduction of a General of the Colombian Army in November 2014 by the
guerrillas, who claim a bilateral cease-fire. General Ruben Alzate is the
highest ranking ever captured by the FARC. Since 2012, the guerrillas undertook
not to remove civilians against ransom, while reserving the right to capture
the police or military as prisoners of war. Two years after the start of
discussions, these events seemed to put at risk the peace negotiations.
The points-discussions
mentioned in the negotiation are important for the solving of Colombian
conflict. But in this new negotiation process, it is worth mentioning a fault:
the absence of some important actors in the process. In this negotiation, there
are only the government and the FARC. The guerrillas of the ELN expressed its intention
to enter into the negotiation process, but there are still no official
statements about it. Besides guerrillas, where are the paramilitaries in this
case? These groups or bands are also major actors in the crisis. In addition to
this, peace in Colombia involves social and political issues. It is not just a
matter of government and the armed groups, but also of the whole society. In
this sense the different key sectors or organizations of civil society are
under-represented in the negotiation process. This can be a failure element in
the process of negotiation for the peace and the end of violence in the
country, because all concerned parties do not participate and are not involved
in the process.
The Colombian conflict cannot and should not be analyzed under its
current form. It is the result of a long history of violent appropriation of
land - and some parts of the rich territory in resource- by the dominant
sectors of the country. It also results in an unfair distribution of wealth.
This process, supported by an emerging class that has benefited from an
alliance of interests between powerful local and regional authorities and the
army and drug traffickers, gave birth to a narco- paramilitary phenomenon. At
the same time, by violence or by more subtle institutional mechanisms, this
process led to the exclusion of popular organizations from the main centers of
power. This makes the resolution of different politics issues impossible, which
keep armed conflict going. These conflicts involve communities of different
regions of the country and are continually increasing the statistics of victims
and displaced populations. Consequently, ´´there are several complex factors
that have contributed to the Colombian civil war. These factors represent not
only the root causes of the conflict but also forces that have allowed for the
continuation of the war and the escalations of violence that characterize its
evolution´´.
The Colombian conflict has multiple components, such as social, economic
and political, etc. These must be
disabled to create conditions for sustainable peace in Colombia. The "war
against terrorism", as argued the USA,
and direct armed confrontations against the guerrillas confirm the government's
claim to deny the political dimension of armed groups and resolve the political
conflict by war. The continuation of justifying the war against armed groups
under the pretext that it would be a war of democracy against the narco-
terrorist is a clear example of a paradox. However, for some politicians war
is, in principle, the easy way for resolving a conflict. When the internal
situation is confused and aggravated, a declaration of war becomes the most
effective way to clarify the record. But the conflict between the government
and armed groups are known for their increasingly frequent violations of
humanitarian and human rights.
In a country that has known war for over fifty years, peace attempts
also require a long negotiation. In most cases, these attempts have been
designed to establish a cease-fire between the armed actors. Beyond the
announcement effects, they do not have lasting consequences on peace. On the
contrary, they have generally led to a reorganization of the conflict, making
its management a structural characteristic of Colombian politics. More
specifically, the discourse on peace allows regulating the armed conflict,
sometimes intensifying it, but never terminating it.
The resolution of the Colombian armed conflict requires political work
and dialogue, where all parties (the government, the armed groups and the civil
society) can talk together, communicate
their wishes, negotiate and give up to resolve disagreements. In addition, all
parties must recognize each other. In the negotiation process, any group should
not be excluded. All groups involved in the conflict must be represented. This
is the weakness of current negotiation process that includes only the FARC and
the government. In many cases, the government seeks to negotiate exclusively
with some groups, such as was the case with the M19 and Paramilitary groups. A
correct mechanic must be created to integrate all groups into the process,
because the FARC is not the only group involved in the conflict. Many other
major groups, such as the FLN, do not participate in the actual negotiation
process. In addition, separate negotiations between the government and groups
do not seem an effective and sustainable solution. It has been so in previous
negotiations: all concerned parties have never been at the same time around the
table of negotiation. In the negotiation process there was always exclusions of
some actors of the crises. In this case, a successful exit from the crisis
is not too obvious.
Violence in Colombia causes approximately 20,000 deaths on average each
year. This war, which is not quite a civil war, is increasingly against
civilians.
Some analysts argue that political motivated guerrillas (FARC, FLN) are still
legitimate. Others believe that drug trafficking would have altered their
ideological pretensions and have transformed into pure economic interests.
In this context, in which some actors have interest to maintain the
current level of violence, any peace initiative remains difficult. In addition,
considering the antagonistic perceptions of the causes of conflict and,
especially, financial motivations of each other, any resolution must first and
foremost take into account the root, which caused the conflict, namely the
income provided by the traffic drugs. In addition, we must also consider the
link between armed groups, members of the government and international
networks. According to the interpretation of the economic and political conflicts
advanced by Tony Addison and Mansoob Murshed, violence is an alternative to
peaceful production as a form of economic activity.
This theory claims that conflicts exist and persist, because they are
financially profitable. In this sense, the perpetuation of violence is a
rational decision that allows realizing more profit than in time of peace.
According to this theory, in Colombia, the primary objective is therefore not
ideological, but economic. Without violence, the lucrative drug traffic could
not take place. Production of the drug is easy and inexpensive, and
additionally extremely profitable.
According to this theory, the parties are rational and their decisions,
either they feel favorable to peace or war, are related to the defense of their
own interests. The persistence of conflict is based on the fact that violence
is the objective of the parties. If they want to resolve the conflict, the
dialogue would inevitably seek to change this dynamic. They would try to make
peace "profitable", or at least also profitable as war, inviting the
main parties to the negotiating table. Such solutions necessarily imply a
change in the balance of power, but how is it possible to break the impasse? On
the one hand, the government forces fail to eliminate the rebels, on the other;
the rebels are not able to gain power. Added to this, there is another
fundamental challenge: how to restore trust between the different parties,
after many failures of previous peace attempts?
Jean Marcelson Abraham
amarcelson@yahoo.fr
License
in Philosophy and master in Intercultural Communication and European Studies
Feldmann Andreas E., Measuring the Colombian "Success"
story, Revista de Ciencia Política, Pontificia Universidad Católica de
Santiago de Chile, vol. 32, núm. 3, 2012, pp. 739-752.
Giselle Lopez, The Colombian Civil War. Potential for Justice in a
Culture of Violence, in: Policy Briefing, Vol. 2 - No. 1.
Kevin Howlett, UN: ´Colombia`s urban rich poor gap worsening, Oct 9th 2013, in:
http://www.colombia-politics.com/urban-inequality-un/
David E. Spencer, Lessons from Colombia’s Road to
Recovery, 1982–2010, Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, (Strategic
Issues in US/Latin American Relations) Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2012.
Mauricio García Durán, Vera Grabe Loewenherz, Otty Patiño Hormaza, M-19‘s
Journey from Armed Struggle to Democratic Politics: Striving to Keep the
Revolution Connected to the People, Berghof Research Center for
Constructive Conflict Management, no. 1,
Berlin, 2008.
Virginia M. Bouvier, New Hopes for Negotiated
Solutions in Colombia, United States Institute of Peace, sept. 2007.
Pécaut Daniel, Réflexion sur la naissance des
guérillas colombiennes, Cahier des Amériques latines, 36, décembre
2001, p.65-92.
Juan-Carlos Guerrero, Une mise en perspective historique du conflit armé
colombien, in : Visages
d’Amérique Latine, no. 3, juin 2006.
Larranaga, Roberto Sancho, Guerrilla
y terrorismo en Colombia y España: ELN y ETA, UNAB, Colombia, 2003.
Lecombe Delphine, Mobilisations autour d'un modèle de
sortie de conflit : la Commission Nationale de Réparation et Réconciliation :
une "commission de vérité et réconciliation" (CVR) colombienne?,
in : Raisons politiques, 2008/I, no 29, pp.59-75.
eceny Mark, Durnan Michael, The FARC's best friend
: U. S. antidrug policies and the deepening of Colombia's civil war in the
1990s , In: Latin American Politics
and Society, Vol. 48, no.2, 2006, p.95-116.
Feldmann Andreas E., Measuring the Colombian "Success"
story, Revista de Ciencia Política, Pontificia Universidad Católica de
Santiago de Chile, vol. 32, núm. 3, 2012.
http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2013/08/26/320651/colombia-govt-farc-resume-talks/
Acuerdo General para la terminación del conflicto y la
construcción de una paz estable y duradera: http://www.latinreporters.com/ColombiaFarcAcuerdoTerminacionConflictoAgosto2012.pdf
http://www.odci.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/2002/senate_select_hearing_03192002.html
[3] More details about
this period see: Pécaut Daniel, Réflexion sur la naissance des guérillas
colombiennes, Cahier des Amériques latines, 36, décembre 2001,
p.65-92.
Cf. Daniel Pécaut, Réflexion sur la naissance des
guérillas colombiennes, in : Cahier
des Amériques Latines, N° 36, p. 64.
Cf. Giselle Lopez, The Colombian Civil War.
Potential for Justice in a Culture of Violence, in: Policy Briefing, Vol.
2, No. 1, p. 7.
Cf Mauricio García Durán, Vera Grabe Loewenherz, Otty
Patiño Hormaza, M-19‘s Journey from Armed Struggle to Democratic Politics:
Striving to Keep the Revolution Connected to the People, Berghof Research
Center for Constructive Conflict Management, no. 1, Berlin, 2008, p. 8.
[8] Cf. Juan-Carlos Guerrero, Une mise en perspective
historique du conflit armé colombien : in Visages d’Amérique Latine,
no. 3, juin 2006, p. 86.
Giselle Lopez, The Colombian Civil War. Potential
for Justice in a Culture of Violence, p. 7.
More details about this negotiation see: Mauricio
García Durán, Vera Grabe Loewenherz, Otty Patiño Hormaza, M-19‘s Journey
from Armed Struggle to Democratic Politics, pp. 25-35.
More details : Lecombe Delphine, Mobilisations
autour d'un modèle de sortie de conflit: la Commission Nationale de Réparation
et Réconciliation : une "commission de vérité et réconciliation"
(CVR) colombienne?, in : Raisons politiques, 2008/I, no 29,
p.59-75.
Virginia M. Bouvier, New Hopes for Negotiated
Solutions in Colombia, United States Institute of Peace, September 2007, p.
25.
Cf. Peceny Mark, Durnan Michael, The FARC's best
friend : U. S. antidrug policies and the deepening of Colombia's civil war in
the 1990s , in: Latin American
Politics and Society, Vol. 48, no.2, 2006, p.95-116.
Giselle Lopez, The Colombian Civil War. Potential
for Justice in a Culture of Violence, p. 7.
Cf. http://www.odci.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/2002/senate_select_hearing_03192002.html,
14.03.2014.
Cf. Feldmann Andreas E., Measuring the Colombian
"Success" story, Revista de Ciencia Política, Pontificia
Universidad Católica de Santiago de Chile, vol. 32, núm. 3, 2012, p. 743.
